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Summary  findings
Cotton exports account for a significant  share of total  Forward  sales have  provided only  limited coverage
commodity  exports in francophone  African  rountries,  against  price risk . The use of cotton futures  anld
suggesting  that these countries  have  a large  exposure  options  could increase  this r  isk coverage.  Futures  and
to volatility  in cotton prices.  options contracts  can also give  these  countries
An analysis  of the cotton marketing  systems  in these  flexibility  in their sales strategies.
countries revealed  that most of the price risk is borne  Countries  planning  to privatize  their cottoni
by the parastatals  and ultimately  by the government.  marketing  sectors  should consider  the use  of ftirres
This has led to problems  in years of low cotton prices  and options because  forward  sales are likely  to decline
when the govcrnment  maintained  high producer  significant'y  in a privatized  system.
prices.  In recent  years, thesc  countries introduced  The authors examined  the feasibility  of UsinIg  New
some flexibility  in their pricing policies  to deal with  York  cotton  futures  and options contracts  as hedging
that problem.  instruments  and found that there were benefits  of
As a means  of managing  their cotton price ri;  k,  reduced  price volatility.  Simulations  for 1989, 1990,
francophone  African  countries  have been using  and 1991 show  in every case that hedging  was effective
forward  sales.  Betwecn  a quarttr and a third of  in reducing  p-ice risk  from 30 percent to 60 percent.
exported cotton has been  sold forward  before  For every 1-percent  reduction  inJ  risk, tne reduction  in
harvesting.  income  ranged from 0.66 percent to 1. 2 percent.
This  paper-a  product of the International  Trade Division,  Intertationiational  Economics  [)epartment  - is part of a
larger effort in the department to investigate  the feasibility  and benefits  of using  risk managemerit  instruments  by
primary  commodity  producers  and exporters  in  developing  countries.  Copie, of the paper are available  free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Dawn Gustafson,  room S7-044,  cxtension
33714 (48 pages). December  1993.
The  Policy Research Working Pa  pe  eries disseminates the findings of uwork  in progress to  encourage the exchangr o'  ideas about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get  the findings  out quickly,  even  if the presentations  are  less  than  fully polilhed.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be used  and cited accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  are  the
authors'  own  and should  not be attributed  to the World  Bank,  its Executive  Board  of Directors,  or any of its memibe-  countries.







The World BankCotton is a very important crop for the Francophone African
(FPA)  countries.  As a percentage of agricultural export revenues,
cotton  export  revenues  ranged  from  6'  for  C8te  d'Ivoire  and
Cameroon to 68% for Burkina Faso in 1990 (see  Table 1).  As can be
seen from this table, reliance on cotton exports has increased over
time for the majority of FPA cotton producers.
The significant share of cotton in agricultural  (and total)
exports  for  many  FPA  countries,  implies  an  exposure  to  the
volatility  in cotton prices.  Moreover, by guaranteeing a fixed
price to the farmers, FPA governments assume the risk from cotton
price fluctuations.
Table 1:  Francophone  Africa: Cotton's  Share of  Agricultural Export
Revenues in the Main Cotton Producing Countries
1964-70  1971-80  1981-90
_  _  ( %  )  __
Benin  13  27  59
Burkina Faso  12  36  68
Cameroon  8  4  6
Central African Rapublic  39  26  26
Chad  69  45  33
C8te d'Ivoire  1  3  6
Mali  13  37  25
Senegal  0  S  9
Togo  5  5  35
Source:  Calculated from data on FAQ trade tapes. 1991.
'We  would  like to thank Jim Steel of REFCO  for providing us
with data and  information.  We would  also like  to thank Ronald
Duncan, Vikram Nehru, and Luc De Wulf for valuable comments.At present the only instrument used for zisk management in FPA
countries  is  forward contracts.  By  the planting  season; when
governments fix the producer price for the year, they usually have
sold about  a  fourth of  the expected  crop  forw&rd.  This  still
leaves  a  significant  part of  price  riEk unhedged.  The use  of
cotton futures/options contracts can supplement forward sales in
order to achieve a more desirable level of hedging.  In addition,
futures  contract  can  add  to  the  flexibility  of  the  selling
decisions.
The recent  liberalization  efforts in FPA countries'  cotton
marketing  systems  are  likely  to  increase  the  need  for  risk
management.  This is because with market liberalization, forward
sales are likely to diminish as counterparty r;.sk  may become larger
when  dealing  with  new  private  exportets.  The  use  of
futures/options can, to  an extent, substitute for forward sales and
provide price risk reduction.
This paper addresses the issues, focusing on the allocation of
price  risk  within  the  existing  cotton  marketing  system  in FPA
countries and  the  implications following market  liberalization.
The paper also quantifies the cotton price  risk and investigates
the  appropriateness of using N.Y. cotton futures  contracts to hedge
FPA cotton price risk.  In particular, simulations using the N.Y.
cotton futures contract show how cotton  price volatility is reduced
by  using  that  contract.  In addition  the  paper  provides  someindication of the trade-off between risk and return when hedging.
This  analysis  includes  sensitivity  analyses with  regard  to the
assumed r'sk aversion and the "bias" between the current and the
expected futures price.  We end with some discussion of how the FPA
countries can use hedging techniques.
The paper is structured as follows:  Section I of the paper
describes  the  marketing  characteriscics  for  cotton  in  FPA
countries, focusing on the issue of the allocation of cotton price
risk within the cotton marketing chain.  Section II quantifies the
cotton price risk and  investiUates the appropriateness of using
N.Y. cotton futures contracts to hedge FPA cotton price risk  A
simulation using the N.Y. cotton futures contract is carried out in
this section to show that cotton price volatility  is reduced by
using N.Y. cotton futures contracts.  Some indication of the trade-
off between risk and return is also given.  Section 'II summarizes
and concludes.I.  COTTON  RKAXETING  IN  FRLCOPHONK AFRIc:
From  the  mid-1960s  through  the  1970s,  cotton  growing  in
Francophone  Africa  benefitted  from  the  de;elopment  of  improved
varieties  and  increased  use  of  fertilizers  and  pesticides.
Although the cotton growing area increased only slowly (0.8%  p.a.)
over this period, production increased at an annual rate of 6.6%
due to the rapidly increasing yields.  These successes led to an
increase in the rate of expansion of the cotton growing area and
furthe- increases -n yields. During the 1980-90 period, therefore,
cotton production in the region increased at an annual rate of 9.7*
p.a..  With domestic consumption increasing only slowly, most of
the increased production was exported.
The increasing dependence on cotton export revenues has raised
the  importance  of  the  risks  from  cotton  price  fluctuations,
especially since the impact of the price fluctuations is sometimes
intensified by unfavorable changes in the exchange rate between the
French franc and the US dollar.  The need for good management of
these price risks was dramatically demonstrated during the two most
recent price cycles--in 1985/86 and 1991/93.
The early development of cotton production in the Francophone
region was  supported  by the  Institut de Recherch6  des Textiles
Exotiques  (IRCT)  which established agricultural research stations
in  the  region  to  provide  technological  support  to  the  cottonindustry  and  the Campagnie  Francaise  des  rextiles (CFDT) which
supplied inputs, credit,  extension informaticn,  marketing services,
the operation of ginneries and oilseed mills, and the transport of
baleu fiber to ports and its export.  Marketing services included
the purchase of seedcotton from farmers at prices announced by the
government  with  no direct  relationship  to prices  obtainable  in
export markets.  Over time, as local personnel gained experience,
the responsibilities for these services were assumed by parastatal
organizations  owned  jointly  by  the  country  and  the  French
government,  such  as  Societe  des  Fibres  Textiles  (SOFITEX)  in
Burkina  Faso  ancl Compagnie  Malienne  pour  le  D6velopment  des
Textiles  (CMDT) in Mali.
A  common  element  of  the  marketing  s-stem  was  a  price
stabilizat.ion  mechanism  which,  in principle,  accumulated  funds
during  seasons of relatively  high prices  to cover  the deficits
during years when low prices prevailed.  In practice, however, the
available funds were often insufficient to support prices during a
prolonged period of low prices.  In this case, the deficit had to
be assumed by the national budget.  In other words, the price risk
was  transferred  to  government  revenues.  Following  massive
disasters to the cotton marketing systems during the period of low
cotton  prices  in  the  mid-1980s,  substantial  reforms  were
implemented.The reforms taken were country-specific but there were common
eltients.  The changes were mainly focused on the producer pricing
arrangement,  the  phased  reduction  and  elimination  of  input
subsidLes, the institutional marketing system, and the taxation of
cotton.  Producer prices  in some countries have been made  more
flexiL,.  by  making  the  price  received  upon  delivery  of  the
seedcotton only a portion of the total expected price.  The total
return to farmers is dependent on profits made by the marketing
organization after  the final sale of the entire crop.  In  ,vme
cases, the function of the marketing agency has been cihanged  so
that it operates under a negotiated fixed-price contract for its
services--in effect it operates with assumed risks and incentives
to encourage operating  efficiencies similar to a private marketing
system.  Moreover,  accounting  systems  have  been  changed  to
accommodate a separation of costs incurred from cotton activities
from those Licurred from other activities performed on behalf of
',he  government.  Tn effect, these changes have shifted some of the
cotton prica risk from the government to farmers and the marketing
organization.
Currently,  the  Francophone  countries  use  forward  sales  to
hedge the price risk.  In recent years the marketing agencies have
sold forward from one quarter to one third of the expected crop by
the time the crop has been planted  (see Tables 2 and 3). This is
limited coverage of the price risk; a limitation which may be due
to the credit risk involved in forward contracts, as reflected inthe probability that the  counterparty will not fulfill the contrdct
and  the difficulty  of  findIng buyers  at  the  appropriaLe  time.
Futures market overcome this credit risk by "marking to markeL" on
a daily basie.  In  principle, futures markets are always available-
-at least  for  the  period  in which  there  Is sufficient  liquidity. 2
Table  2:  Prancophone  Africa:  Coton  Planting  awd  Harvesting  Patterns
CounUy  Planting  Dates  Harvesting  Dates
Benin  June-July  Oct-Doc
DurlhiVA  Paso  June-July  Nov-Dec
Cameroon  mid-July  Nov-Dec
Cntal  Africa  Republic  Late  June-ealy  July  Nov-Jan
Chad  June  Nov-Dec
CMe  d'Ivoire  June-A  ;g  Oct-Jan
Mali  June-July  Oct-Dec
Senegal
Togo  June-July  Nov-Dec
Source: International  Cotton  Advisory  Committee.
2The  total  annual  cotton  production  of  FPA  countries  is
approximately 550,000 tons.  In the New York cotton futt'res  market
260,000  tons are  traded  daily.  The majority  of  the  trades  is
concentrated  in  the  four  nearby  contracts,  covering  about  7-8
months ahead.  Options contracts are less liquid.  There is daily
trading of about 100,000 tons of cotton in options with liquidity
concentrated  in  the  two  nearby  contracts,  covering  4-5  months
ahead.  The size of the N.Y. cotton futures contract is 50,000 lb
(roughly 23 tons).Table 3:  Francophone  Africa; Seasonal  Cotton Export Commitment  1989/90  to 1992/93
Marketing Year
_  _  ___  1989/90 _  1990/91  1991/92  /199293
VohHme/Snare  Tons  Share  Tons  Share  Tons  Share  Tons  Share
_-  _____  - (%-1(  7  1-  ,
Sales  date
Mid-July  163  34  128  25  77  14
Mid-Aug/Sept  200  42  205  40
Mid-Nov  272  60  233  48  260  50  182  34
Mid-Jan  296  65  309  64  327  63  305  56
Mid-March  413  91  j88  81  469  90  329  61
Mid Hay  430  95  450  94  482  93  461  85
Crop-Year  455  481  |  519  543 est
Exports  i  mto  - -o-nite-
Source: International  Cotton  Advisory  Commnittee.International  markets  for  commodity  futures  and  options  offer
an  efficient  way  to  provide  short-term  (intra-year)  price  stabilitl
co farmers  and it is  often  in the  interest  of exporters,  "nd  other
intermediaries  and local  banks  to provide  such  services  to farmers
(for example,  to  reduce  the  rirk  of  loan  default)  . However,
exporters  and  local  baisks  will  be constrained  in  offering  such  risk
management  services  tcj  farmers  'f  price  signals  are  not  transmitted
efficiently  and  puice  formation  is  not  transparent. Such  problems
could  be due  to  noncormpetitive  transportation  and storace  systems,
lack  o; harmonized  gradir.-  standards,  and government  interference
along  the  marketing  chain  (see  Larson,  1993;  and  Varang.  s,  Thigpen,
and Akiyama, 1993).  In addition,  local exporters,  traders and
banks  will  be constrained  in using  commodity  futures  exchanges  by
their  cash flow  ability  to obtain  margins  for futures contracts.
Creditworthiness  issues  can  also  provide  a  constraint,  as  brokerage
firms  may not  be willing  to take  the country  risk. 4
Under the present  cotton  marketing  systems  in FPA countries
th, majority  of the price  risk falls  on the parastatal  marketing
organization  and ultimately  on the government.  In a liberalized
marketing  system  in the absence  of risk  management  practices  the
majority  of price  risk is  likely  to be  borne  by the  farmer.  In the
3Farmers  are  not  expected  to  use futures  and  options  directly.
Large exporters  and intermediaries  are more likely to use them
enabling  them  to  provide  short-term  price  stability  to  the  farmers.
'The creditworthiness of the particular exporter, trader and
bank is less  of a concern  as  margin  calls  deal  with  this  problem.case  of privatized  cotton export  marketing,  the use  of forward
sales is likely to diminish because of counterparty risk.  Private
exporters, particularly newly established ones, are perceived by
foreign  traders as being  a  greater  risk  than  parastatals  (for
example, the case of cocoa  in Nigeria).  In that case,  futures
contracts can substitute for forward export sales.  In addition,
domestic cash and forward markets can provide efficient mechanisms
for transferring risk  from farmers to intermediaries, banks and
private  exporters.  However,  because  the  latter  handle  large
volumes, they can pool risks of a large number of farmers and hedge
it in the international markets by using  cotton futures/options
markets.  Thus,  domestic  cash  and  forward  markets  provide
mechanisms for internal risk sharing with the risk not leaving the
country  (risk  is  internalized),  while  futures/options  markets
externalize  the price  risk  by  placing  it in  the  :,nternational
market where agents are more capable and more willing to absorb it.
The  combination  of  domestic  cash/forward  and  international
futures/options markets is likely to provide the most transparent11
and efficient (lowest  cost) way of risk sharing and short-run price
stabilization.5
The Costa Rican coffee marketing system is a good example of
such a  system (see  Claessens and Varangis, 1993).  Farmers receive
a first payment for their coffee from the miller/exporter at time
of sale with subsequent quarterly payments and a final payment at
the  end  of  the  year.  Before  millers/exporters  began  to  use
futures/options they advanced only a relatively small fraction of
the expected price due to the uncertainty of the final price at the
end of the year.  However, with  the adoption of financial  risk
management,  the millers/exporters advance a significantly larger
part of the expected price and hedge their exposure by buyinig  put
options  (the  premium for the purchase of these options is charged
5The establishment  of cash/forward markets is not the only
mechanism  that  can  provide  internal  risk  sharing  in  primary
commodity markets. There are informal risk sharing arrangements,
such  as  activity  diversification.  However,  formal  cash/forward
markets  provide  a  transparent  price  discovery  system,  wide
dissemination of pricing information and a guarantee that contracts
will  be  honored.  The  development  of  these  functions  is
particularly  important  in a newly  liberalized marketing  system.
With  the  withdrawal  of  government  from  the  marketing  system,
commodity  buyers  and  sellers are  uncertain  how prices  will  be
determined,  how  they  can  find  price  information  about  similar
qualities, and whether they will be paid for their sales or receive
the commodities they paid for.to the farmer)  .6  In this way, the Costa Rican coffee farmer has
protection against coffee price falls.
Another example is Mexico, where the recent liberalization of
the grains and oilseeds marketing system calls for the creation of
regional spot and forward markets.  Under the new system farmers
are to use the domestic forward markets if they want to "lock-in"
a price  for sr-ie  future period and larger trading firms will be
able to pool, via the forward markets, the price risk from several
farmers and hedge it in the US commodity exchanges.  Processors can
use forward markets also to hedge their input costs.  Sellers of
forward contracts  (mainly farmers) collaterlize their transations
with their warehouse receipts while the  buyers of forward contracts
have initial and variation margins.
The establishment of spot and forward markets requires that
several preconditions need to be met. 7 Among the most important
ones are: no government intervention in  price setting; many buyers
and sellers; equal access of market information; the existence of
widely  acceptable  warehouse  receipts;  acceptable  quality
'Before options were widely  used  in the Costa Rican  coffee
marketing system,  exporters/millers advanced 40-50t  of the  expected
final Frice.  Even with this low first payment, there were three
years  in  the  last  15  years  that  a  number  of  Costa  Rican
exporters/millers  went  bankrupt  because  of  large  unexpected
declines  in  coffee  prices.  With  the  use  of  options,
exporters/millers  now  advance  up  to  80% of  the  expected  final
price.
7For  an extensive discussion see Glaessner, et. al., 1991.classification standards; property rights; and enforceability of
contracts.  At present, most of the necessary preconditions  are
hard  to meel  in most  FPA  countries.  The  governments  in these
countries  should  try  to  provide  the  appropriate  legal  and
regulatory  framework that  would  aid  the development  of  forward
markets.  A role that the parastatals  could play in the interim
period  is that  of a  buyer  of  laLt resort. Also  complying with
contracts could foster the credibility of the new c-9tem.  However,
there is a danger that parastatals could crowd--.,  -rivate  sector
involvement and resume their previous role of a  psonist.
Futures  contracts  can  play  a  significant  role  -under the
current cotton commercialization system in FPA countries and also
during the transitional period to a more liberalized system.  Given
the limited coverage *provided  by forward sales, there is scope for
cotton futures contracts in complementing forward sales in hedging
price  risk.  The use of futures contracts can smooth  intra-year
price  volatility  and can provide  a mechanism  for adjustment  to
medium and longer term price movements.  In  addition, use of future
contracts can make withdrawals from or accruals into the existing
cotton stabilization funds more predictable.  To the extent that
cotton prices follow a random walk pattern, at least in the short
to  medium  run  (as do  other  commodity  prices),  the  stochastic
component of price  variability can become  overwhelming,  thereby
increasing  the  error  associated  with  price  expectations  and
hampering the ability of stabilization fund managers to determine14
a "long-run"  support price. 8 In addition,  the use of financial
instruments will  generate  revenue-based risk  benefits  for
governmental  backing  of stabilization  funds.
The  use  of  futures/options can  also  provide  valuable
flexibility  to  marketing  agents  in FPA  cotton  produciiig  countries.
Forward  sales  assume  that  exporters  have  to find  a buyer  which  at
times  may  be difficult. Futures  markets  are  always  there  and  have
enough  liquidity  for  relatively  small  cotton  producers  such  as the
FPA countries. 9 Thus, using futures  contracts  can be of help in
cases  of inadequate  liquidity  in the  physical  market (no  immediate
buyers).
To a certain extent,  the use of futur,as  contracts,  forward
sales  and stabilization  funds,  substitute  for  and complement  each
other. However,  futures  and  forward  sales  remove  mainly  intra-year
price  volatility  while  stabilization  funds  are  more  useful  for  the
reduction  of inter-year  price  volatility. Given  the  importance  of
futures  contracts  in risk sharing  and reducing  short-term  price
volatility  under both the current and a  liberalized  marketing
system,  we proceed  with the quantification  of the risk reduction
benefits  from  hedging  PPA cotton  prices.
tLarson  dnd  Coleman  (1991)  showed  that  the  use  of market-bases
financial  instruments,  such as futures  and options,  can increase
the  probable  life  of stabilization  funds.
9As stated earlier, a volume equivalent to 2/3 of FPA annual
cotton production is traded everyday in  the New  York cotton
exchange.In the remainder of the paper, simulations are performed to
quantify the reduction in cotton price volatility from using  the
New York No. 2  cotton futures contract.16
IX,  HEDGING THROUMG NEW YORK COTTON FUTURES
Prices received for FPA cotton have fluctuated significantly,
especially in the latter half of the 1980's. Figure 1 depicts the
volatility of FPA cotton export prices  (c.i.f.  North Europe) over
the period May  '85-Jan '93. The average monthly export price over
this period was US¢66.64/lb with a standard deviation of ¢12.78. In
the sub-period Jan. '86  and Dec. '90,  price volatility was scmewhat
higher, with a standard deviation of ¢13.16 around a mean price of
¢68.87/lb.  Thus the coefficient of variaLion for the period Jan.
'86-Dec. '90  is 19.1W which is higher than the volatility of world
prices over the same period.  This volatility is estimated to be
around 17%.
Futures  markets  provide a convenient mechanism for  hedging
this type of  risk. 10 However,  the only market  that trades  in
cotton futures is the  New York Cotton Exchange (NYCE).  The New York
No. 2 cotton contract is based on grade 41, staple 34 (strict low
middling 1-1/16 inch) cotton. The quality cf FPA cotton is similar
(middling  1-3/32  inch)  but  not  identical.  Provided  that  the
characteristics of t'.e  cash commodity is identical to the quality
specified in the futures contract, the traditional recommendation
is to hedge all of the cas',  commodity in the futures market. (This
'OSince  options are options on futures contracts, the analysis
presented  here  can  be  easily  extended  to  include  options
strategies.  In addition, the analysis to determine the basis risk
is applicable to the use of options on these futures contracts.FIGURE  1
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type of a hedge  is termed a  "direct hedge"). However,  in cases
where the cash and futures prices are for related but not similar
commodities,  the  appropriateness  of  the  futures  contract  for
"cross-hedging"  needs  to  be  determined.' 1 A  simple  method  of
determination is Lo see how closely the cotton futures price and
FPA cotton export prices move together. In general, the higher the
correlation the greater the effectiveness of a hedge. Table 4 shows
the results of an OLS (Ordinary  Leapt Squares) regression in which
(nearby) futures price changes were  regressed on FPA cash price
changes.2 The R-square measure indicates that 30' of the variance
of cash price changes is explained by futures price changes. The
percentage  of  the  variation  in  cash  price  changes  which  is
unexplained  (1-R square =  70%) is an estimate of the basis risk.
Thus, the basis risk is high but this is to be expected because the
underlying  cash and  futures prices  are for different  grades  of
cotton and US policy has to some extent insulated US markets from
the world cotton market. A cross-hedge in this situation is still
feasible but the optimal quantity to be hedged as a percentage of
the cash  ccmmodity  - i.e.,  the optimal  hedge  ratio  - needs  to be
" 1A  typical cross-hedge in cotton is to hedge the price of oine
quality by using a futures contract based on a marginally different
quality, such as West African Cotlook A index cotton  (mi(idling  1-
3/32 inch quality) being hedged with a New York number 2  futures
contazt based  on strict  low middling  1-1/16  inch quality.  The
futures contract would be liquidated simultaneously with the sale
of the physical cotton.
12 Note that the OLS regression uses price changes rather than
price levels because cash and futures prices of most commodities
are  non-stationary  (Milonas  and  Vora,  1987).  A  simple
transformation such as using differenced data,  as we have done,
controls for price-level non-stationarity.Table 4:  Regression  Results  for Test of Basis  Risk
Regression  J  D  R2  D-W
(St+ I - S)  = c  +  8 (F, +I -F)  -.09  .34*  .30  1.30
(-.32)  (6.14)
(S+ I - S) =  r + B (I,+,-  I)  -.04  .80*  .80  2.08
(-.25)  (19.04)
.i,  1~.
Notes:  1.  Monthly data for the period May '85 - Jan.  '93  (93 observations) were used in both
regressions. S stands for the spot price, F for the futures price and I stands for the price of the
Cotlook A Index and D-W for the Durbin-Watson  Statistic. T-statistics  are in parenthesis and
starred variables indicate  significance  at the 99% level.
2.  The Cotlook  A Index is published  daily by Cotlook Limited, a cotton information  service in
the United  Kingdom. The A index is an average  of the 5 lower quotes  in USC/lb  for cotton  being
offered in significant  quantities  from 14 cotton growing  regions in 13 producing  countries. The
Index is based on cotton comparable  to middling 1-3/32 inch  quality by the "Liverpool"  concept,
delivered  C.I.F. North Europe, cash against  documents  on arrival of vessel, including  profit and
agent's commission. The Index is presented  as an indication  of the competitive  level of offering
prices.
3.  All variables are stationary in first differences.empirically determined. The optimal hedge ratio depends upon the
hedger's level of risk-aversion. Hedging is  useful if the reduc':ion
in risk is sufficient to compensate for the reduction in returns.
We report calculations of the optimal hedge ratios for FPA cotton
at different levels of risk aversion later in the paper.
Before a determination of the optimal hedge ratio is made
it would be of interest to check the relationship between FPA cash
prices  and  Cotlook A  Index  prices. This  is because  a  recently
introduced cotton futures cont:ract  based on the Cotlook  A index may
make this contract a more appropriate hedging instrument than the
New York No. 2 futures contract. 1 3 Table 4 reports the results of
regressing  Cotlook  A  Index  price  changes  on  FPA  cotton  price
changes.  14 The R-Square indicates that 80% of the variation in FPA
cotton prices is explained by changes in the Cotlook A Index. This
reasonably good fit is not surprising given that FPA cotton prices
form one of the thirteen components of the Cotlook A  index. The
fact  that  FPA  prices  and  Cotlook  prices  were  significantly
correlated" 5 implies that the Cotlook futures contract may prove a
better hedging instrument for FPA cotton than the New York No.2
"3For  the definition of the Cotlook A index see note #2 under
Table 4.
1 4we use spot-to-spot regression rather t'lan  spot-to-futures
because there is not sufficient data on Cotlook futures  prices. We,
therefore, assume a  close relationship  between Cotlook index  prices
and Cotlook futures prices.
" 5The  correlation between SSA export price changes and Cotlook
price changes is 0.89. The correlation coefficient turned out to be
significant at the 99% level.cotton  futures contract. However,  the present very low level of
liquidity  of  the  contract  is  likely  to discourage  use  of  this
contract for hedging purposes.
Although  the  New  York  number  I  cotton  futures  contract
represents a cross-hedge, it  was effective in  decreasing volati1ity
in the simulations.  Moreover,  the New York Cotton Exchange has
added additional serial months to the Cotlook World Cotton Futures
contract--for which settlement is based on the Cotlook A Index--to
increase the trading and hedging opportunities for market users.
In addition to the regular cycle months  of March, May, August,
October, and December, two spot or serial months from the January,
February,  April,  September,  and  November  cycle  will  also  be
available.  The Exchange anticipates that the addition of rolling
spot  months  will  increase  the  contract's  liquidity  and  afford
hedgers and speculators a more viable trading vehicle.
11.1  Risk Minimization  (Ex-Ante  Risk-Minimizing Hedaes)
We turn now to analyzing the risk  management prospects for
FPA  cotton.  We  will  assume  throughout  this  section  that  the
objective of the hedger is simply to minimize risk.
The FPA hedging decision can be thought of as a portfolio
selection  problem  in  which  the  hedger  selects  the  optimal212
proportions of unhedged  (spot) and hedged  (futures) output." 6 The
FPA portfolio can then be represented as:
ERp  Q  E(St+,  - S 1) + Qh  E(F,+,  - Ft)  ..............  (1)
where:
ERp  - Expected return on the hedged portfolio
Qu  - Unhedged  output
E(St+l  - St)  =  Expected  change  in the  FPA  export  price  from  time  t
to time t+1
°h  =  Hedged output
E(F,+l  - Ft)  =  Expected  change  in the  futures  price  from  time  t
to time t+1
Note that (Qu  +  Qh)  =  Qe,  the amount of output available for export.
At time period t, the values of St+,  and F,+ 1 are unknown. These are,
therefore, random variables.  In a hedge, Q,  and  Qh  have opposite
signs. For instance, in a short hedge, a long position in the spot
market  (QU >  0) is  offset by a short pczition in the futures market
(Qh  <  0).  Rewriting  equation  1  for  a  long  cash/short  futures
position we have:
ERp  =  Qu  [  E(S,+,-  St)  - (Qh /Q.)  E(Ft+,-  Ft)]  .........  (2)
16  In  terms of conventional portfolio theory, hedged output can
be thought of as a riskless asset and unhedged output as a risky
asset.Let h - (Qb  /  Qu)  If the value of Q,  is set equal to 1, then h can
be interpreted as the hedge ratio - the percentage of t'le  spot or
cash position that is hedged in the futures market. Thus,
ERp  - E(St+  - S,) - h E(Ft,+  - Ft)  .......  ......... (3)
If the portfolio  is completely hedged, that is, each unit in the
spot market  is hedged with a unit of futures, then h =  1.  (T  i.
type of a hedge is called a "naive  hedge".) If  h =  0, then there is
no hedging and the expected return on the portfolio is simply equal
to t;he  rx-turn  on the spot market.
The variance of the portfolio is a measure of the risk of
the portfolio. The variance of the portfolio  (Var(P))  is given by:
Var(P)  =  Var(S)  +  h2 Var(F)  - 2 h cov(S,F)  .(4)
where:
Var(S), Var(F) =  variance of spot and futures price changes
cov(S,F) =  covariance between spot and futures price changes
Recall, that we assumed that thie  objective of the FPA countries was
simply to minimize risk. The problem then is to identify a h, such
that Var(P)  is minimized.  This  can  be  done  by  differentiating
Var(P) with respect to h as follows:24
a  Var(P)/ 8h  =  2 h Var(F) - 2 cov(S,F) =  0
Solving for h from the above results in:
h  =  cov(S,F) /  Var(F)  ..................  (5)
It cait  be shown that h*(the  risk-minimizing hedge ratio) is simply
the slope coefficient of an OLS linear regression of futures price
changes on spot price changes (see Ederington, 1979).
We constructed three ex-ante hedges for FPA cotton using
the risk-minimizing hedge ratios. The sowing season for FPA cotton
ends around July-August  (see Table 2) and cotton is sold forward
continuously from then onwards until about June of the next year.
Table 3 indicates that 85-95* of FPA cotton is sold by about May.
No data on forward prices were available so we used futures prices
to  simulate hedges over a period of three years to evaluate the
risk management prospects  for FPA cotton  through hedgirg  in the
futures market. We assumed that the hedge is placed in October of
each year by buying the July No. 2 contract and lifted at the end
of  June  before  the  contract matures.  The  timing  of  the hedge,
therefore, approximately coincides with the cotton season in FPA
countries. Hedges for 1989, 1990, and 1991  were constructed in this25
manner.  17
The  risk-minimizing  hedge  ratios  for  each  year  were
calculated by using information available only up to the period in
which the hedge was placed. Thus, the hedge ratio for the Oct. 1989
hedge was estimated using data between Sept. 1985 and Sept. 1989;
the hedge ratio for the Oct. 1990 hedge was estimated using data
between  Sept.  1985  and  Sept.  1990,  and  so  on.  These  hedges  are  thus
ex-ante  hedges.
Table  5  reports  the  estimated  risk-minimizing  hedge  ratios
and contrasts the performance  of three portfolios - Unhedged,
Naive,  and Risk-Minimizing  - over the life of the hedges. It is
apparent from the results that in every one of thpse hedges the
risk of the unhedged position exceeded the risk of the hedged
position.  Notice  also  that  if  a  policy  of covering  all  of the  spot
position  in the futures  market  had been followed,  the risk  of the
naive  portfolio  would  have  been  less  than  the  unhedged  portfolio  in
two of the hedges  but substantially  more  than  the unhedged  in one
of the hedges 18. This is not surprising  given that naive hedges
work  well only  when the spot commodity  and the futures  commodity
"7The  estimated  risk-minimizing  hedge  ratios  appear  to be  very
similar  for  each  of these  periods.  This indicates  the robustness
of the  estimated  hedge  ratio  over  periods (see  Table  5).
18In  the  Oct.  1991  hedge  the  variance  of  the  naive  portfolio  is
less  than  the  variance  of the  risk-minimizing  portfolio.  It  should
be remembered  that  the risk-minimizing  portfolio  is ex-ante  risk-
minimizinc.  The ex-post risk-mini.nizing  portfolio may be quite
different.are identical.
We can also calculate the risk reduction benefits of
hedging  as the percentage  of the  unhedged  variance  that  the risk-
minimizing  or naive  hedge  eliminates.  Thus,
e  Reduction  in  Risk =  1 - (Var(Hedged)/Var(UnHedged))
These  benefits  range  from  60.3'  for  the Oct.  1989  risk-minimizing
hedge  to -121.3'  for  the  Naive  hedge  of  Oct.1990.  The  negative  sign
implies  that  by hedging  all  output,  the  risk  of  the  naive  portfolio
actually i  s  over that of the unhedged portfolio.  This
simply  reiterates  the fact  that  naive  hedges  are inappropriate  for
FPA  cotton. Table  5  actually  increases over  that  of  the  unhedged
portfolio.  This  simply  reiterates  the fact  that  naive  hedges  are
inappropriate  for  FPA cotton.
One other important  point needs to be made about these
hedges.  Tn one of the  years,  the unhedged  portfolio  gave  a higher
(positive)  return  than  the  risk-minimizing  portfolio.  In  the  other
two years, the risk-minimizing  and unhedged  positions  both lost
money, with the risk-minimizing  position losing  almost twice as
much  as the  unhedged  in  one case. Hedging  carries  a cost  in terms
of foregone  returns  and whether  the hedger  considers  these  costs
reasonable  or not depends  upon  attituas  to risk (i.e.  degree  ofTable 5:  Performance  of Hedged and Unhedged  portfolios.
|_______________ October  1989 Hedge
Portfolio  Hedge Ratios  Retum  r  Variance  Risk Reduction
Unhedged  h  = 0  .47  5.29
Naive  h =  1  -.32  2.96  44.0%
Risk-Minimizing  h* =  .298  .23  2.10  60.3%
October 1990  Hedge
Portfolio  Hedge Ratios  Retum  Variance  Risk Reduction
Unhedged  h  =  0  -.34  3.80
Naive  h =  1  -1.36  8.41  -121.3%
Risk-Minimizing  h* =  .309  -.66  1.54  59.5%
October 1991 Hedge
Portfolio  Hedge Ratios  Retum  Variance  Risk Reduction
Unhedged  h =  0  -.68  6.71
Naive  h =  1  -.07  4.45  33.7%
Risk-Minimizing  h*  =  .314  -.49  4.54  32.3%
Notes: A negative  sign for risk-reduction  indicates  risk-increasing  rather than risk-reducing.
L = 0 means completely  unhedged.
L =  1 means fully hedged.
h* =  is the optimal  hedge ratio.U
risk-aversion)  .9  We  have  assumed  in  this  section  that  FPA
countries are risk-minimizers and we have been able to show that
ex-ante hedging can reduce risk. All the three hedges we simulated
were, from the standpoint of risk-minimization, successful.
11.2  Risk Aversion and Ex-Post Hedaes
We have assumed up to this point that the objective of FPA
countries is to minimize risk and we have shown in the previous
section that risk reduction through hedging is certainly possible.
However,  risk  reduction  generally  carries  a  cost  in  terms  of
foregone returns as we pointed out earlier. Whether  the hedger
minimizes risk or maximizes return depends upon the level of risk
aversion. If the hedger is infinitely risk-averse minimizing risk
is the appropriate  choice, whereas a hedger with a low level of
risk aversion would be willing to bear a substantial amount of risk
for the opportunity  of increased returns.  In this  section, we
quantify  the risk-return  trade-offs from hedging FPA cotton and
estimate  the  optimal  hedge  ratios  at  different  levels  of  risk
aversion.
In order to introduce risk aversion into the analysis, we
need to modify the portfolio model of hedging developed earlier.
Suppose  now  that  the  expected  utility  (EU)  function  of  FPA
!!Additional costs  include  the  brokerage  fee  (usually  1
thousandth  of  the  contract  value)  and  the  opportunity  cost of
holding a ntarqin  account--i.e., the  difference between the interest
bearing notes of the margin account and investing somewhere else.
However, these coats are considered very small.29
countries  is a  function  of  the  expected  return  (ERp)  and  variance
of  the  portfolio  Var(P).  Thus,
EU  =  E(R4) - X  Var(P)  ..................  (6)
where  X  is a  risk  aversion  parameter  and  E (Rp)  and  Var(P)  are  as
defined  in  equations  3  and  4  respectively.  Higher  (lower)  values  of
X imply  higher  (lower)  levels  of  risk  aversion.  The  model  above  is
a  mean-variance  model  (see  Markowitz,  1959)  and  implicitly  assumes
that  the  hedger  has  a  quadratic  utility  function  or  that  returns
are  normally  distributed. 2 0 The  optimization  problem  is  to  select
the  h  which  will  maximize  EU.  Thus,
aEU/ah  =  - E (Ft+,-Ft)  - 2Xh Var  (F)  +  2X  cov  (S,  F)  =  O
Solving  for  the  optimal  (utility-maximizing)  hedge  ratio,  h'*,  from
the  above  gives,
h  =  [cov(S,F)  /  Var(F)]  - [E(Ft+1-Ft)  /  2X Var(F)]  .....  (7)
Using  equation  (5)  this  r 1 iay  be  rewritten  as:
20  Quadratic  utility  functions  raise  several  theoretical
problems  (see  Arrow,  1971)  but  work  by  Levy  and  Markowitz  (1979)
and  Kroll,  Levy,  and  Markowitz  (1984)  suggest  that  the  assumption
of  quadratic  utility  is  a  reasonable  empirical  approximation.30
h*  h  - [E(Ft+ 1-Ft) /  2X Var(F)] ....................  (8)
The first term in equation (8)  is called the hedging component and
this is, of course, the same as the risk-minimizing hedge ratio.
Notice that if X-*w  (i.e., infinite risk-aversion) the second term
disappears and the optimal (utility-maximizing)  hedge ratio is, in
this case, the same as the risk-minimizing hedge ratio  (i.e. h* =
h*).  The second term in equation  (8) is called  the speculat  e
component and this is inversely related to X and positiveJy related
to the "bias" between the current and the expected futures price.
The  speculative  component  essentially  captures  the  effect  of
hedging on expected returns.
We estimated ex-post optimal hedge ratios for FPA cotton
using the July 1990 futures contract. We assumed that the hedge was
placed in the first month of trading of the July contract in March
1989 and lifted in June 1990 before the expiration of the contract.
Table 6 reports estimates of the optimal hedge ratio at different
levels of  risk aversion and the associated return and risk levels.
It is clear  from the table that for values  of X  between 10 and
infinity, the optimal  hedge ratio is  essentially constant, implying
that for these values of risk aversion, the speculative component
is insignificant. This result is similar to Rolfo's  (1980)  result
on optimal  hedging  for cocoa producing  countries  and Ouattara,
Schroeder, and Sorenson's  (1992)  work on coffee hedging for Cote
d'Ivoire. At values of X equal to or lesser than .10,  the resultsTable 6:  Optimal Hedge Ratios, Retum and Risk at Varying Leve!s  of Risk Aversion
Risk Aversion
Parameter  Optimal Hedge Ratios
X  h**  Return  Variance
00  .6547  0.53  3.39
10,000  .65  0.53  3.39
1,000  .65  0.53  3.39
100  .65  0.53  3.39
10  .65  0.53  3.39
1.0  .58  0.61  3.44
.10  -.12  1.41  7.83
.01  -7.05  9.40  447.02
.001  -76.36  89.25  44,365.60
.0001  -769.53  887.78  4,436,223.14.U
imply that FPA countries should buv rather than sell futures (i.e.
negative values of h"  imply a long position in futures). This is
not  a  surprising  result  in view  of  the  relation  that  existed
between F,  and E(F,, 1)  over the period of the hedge between March
1989 and June 1990. Equation (8)  implies that the mean bias between
the futures price at time t+1 and t, is negatively related to h**,
ceteris paribus 21. Over the hedge period, the mean value of (F,+,-F,)
was equal to 1.152. Given that the mean ex-nost bias was positive,
it is not surprising that  at lower levels of risk  aversion the
recommendation is to go net long in futures to profit  from this
bias.
We calculated portfolio returns and variances for hedge
ratios between 0 and 1. These results are reported in Table 7 and
graphed in Figure 2. Figure 2 is a "mean-variance opportunity set"
and depicts the risk-return  trade-offs from hedging FPA cotton.
Point M is the minimum variance portfolio with a return of 0.53 and
a  variance of 3.39. Portfolios on the negatively sloped portion of
the opportunity set are inefficient  because, for the sama variance,
portfolios on the positively sloped portion yield a higher return.
This means that we can effectively eliminat- all  portfolios  with
hedge ratios greater than the minimum variance hedge ratio since
21 Equation  8 also implies that if  the current futures price is
an unbiased  estimate of  next period's  futures price  (i.e. Ft  =
E[F,+ 1])  the speculative  component in h**  disappears and h"  =  h
Thus,  in an unbiased  futures market,  the  risk-minimizing  hedge
ratio is equal to the optimal hedge ratio.Table 7:  Risk-Return  Trade-Offs
Risk-
Aversion  Optimal  %  =
Parameter  Hedge  Reduction  Reduction
X  Ratio  Return  Variance  in Return  in Variance  Cost
.1176  0  1.28  6.60  - - -
.1388  .10  1.16  5.70  9  14  .66
.1694  .20  1.05  4.94  18  25  .72
.2171  .30  .93  4.34  27  34  .79
.3024  .40  .82  3.88  36  41  .87
.4978  .50  .70  3.57  45  46  .98
1.4078  .60  .59  3.42  54  48  1.12
00*  .6547*  .53*  3.39*  59*  49*  1.21*
-1.70  .70  .47  3.41  63  48  1.30
-.53  .80  .36  3.55  ;'2  46  1.56
-.31  .90  .24  3.84  81  42  1.94
-.22  1  1.0  .13  4.29  90  35  2.57
Note:  *Indicates  values associated  with the minimum-variance  portfolio.FIGURE  2
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Variance  (Risk)these lie on the negatively sloped portion of the opportunity set.
In  Table 7,  hedge ratios  greater than the minimum-variance
hedge ratio are associated with negative values of X. This implies
that portfolios associated with these hedge ratios will never be
selected unless the utility function is negatively sloped in mean-
variance  space. A  negatively  sloped  utility  function  implies a
risk-lover rather than a risk-averter. The negative values of X
simply  confirm  that  with  risk-aversion,  portfolios  on  the
negatively sloped portion of the  opportunity set cannot  be optimal.
we  also  calculated  the  explicit  costs  of  hedging  FPA
cotton. We compared the return and risk of the unhedged position
with the return and risk of the hedged positions  to calculate a
cost  elasticity measure as follows:
Cost of Hedging =  (tReduction in Return) /  (%  Reduction in Risk)
where:
e  Reduction in Return= 1 - [(Return  of Hedged) /  (Return  of
Unhedged)]
and the percentage reduction in risk is as defined earlier. These
costs  are shown in the last column of Table 6  and range from a low
of .66 to a high of 2.57 with larger values implying higher costs
of risk reduction. The cost associated with the minimum-varianceportfolio is 1.21 which implies that a 1% reduction in risk will
result in  a 1.211 reduction in return. Whether this is a reasonable
cost  of  hedging  or  not  depends  upon  the  FPA  countries  risk
aversion. The particular point on the efficient frontier where the
FPA countries will  choose  to lie depends upon  their  subjective
risk-return attitudes.
II.3  Bfa.itivitv  of  the  Optimal Hedge Ratio to Changes In the  Bias
We mentioned in the previous section that over the sample
period, the ex-post bias  (b)  between current and expected futures
prices  (i.e.  b  - [F,,+-Ft])  was  positive  leading  to  the
recommendation  to go net long  in futures at low levels of risk
aversion. The bias, however, tends to fluctuate from one period to
another and there is no a priori reason  why it could not be either
positive or negative. Hence,  it is important to investigate the
effect of changes in the bias on the optimal hedge ratio.
A straightforward way of determining the effect of the  bias
on  the optimal hedge  ratio  is to differentiate equation  8 with
respect to b, holding everything else constant. Thus,
8h@/db  - [1  /  2) Var(F)]  <  0 .....................  (9)
The  result  of  this  differentiation  indicates  that  for  given
(2ofitive.  finiLe) values of X, a marginal increase in b will leadto a decrease in the optimal hedge ratio. Table 8  reports the
marginal  effects  of increases  in b on the optimal  hedge  ratio  for
given levels  of risk  aversion.  Notice  that at larger  values  of X
the  marginal  effect  of  an increase  in  b is  virtually  insignificant.
Figure  3  depicts  the  effects  on the  optimal  hedge  ratio  of changes
in the bias for  two low values  of risk  aversion;  X-1.4078  and
X-.11 762. Notice that even at the fairly  low x  value of 1.4078,
the optimal hedge ratio barely declines even though the bias
changes considerably.  At X  - .1176,  however,  the response  to a
change in the bias is considerably  stronger. (The  slope of the
curve,  Oh'/8b,  at X=1.4078  is -0.569  and  the  slope  at X-.1176  is -
0.047,  see  Table  8.)  These  results  indicate  that  except  at  very  low
levels  of risk  aversion,  changes  in the  bias  do not significantly
affect  the optimal  hedge  ratio.
Even  though  changes  in  the  bias  do  not  significantly  affect
the optimal  hedge ratio at larger  values of  risk aversion,  they
change  considerably  the shape (and  risk-return  trade-offs)  of the
portfolio  opportunity set.  Figure  4  graphs  two  portfolio
opportunity  sets.  The first  of these  is  a reproduction  of Figure  2
which is drawn  using the ex-post  bias value  of 1.152.  The second
portfolio  set is  drawn  on the  assumption  of a lower  bias  value  of
'There  is  nothing  distinctive  about  these  risk  aversion  values
except  that  they  correspond  to optimal  hedge  ratio  values  of 0  and
0.60  in Table  6.Table 8:  Marginal  Effects of an Increase in the Bias at Varying  Levels of Risk Aversion
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0  b=i.152  +  b=1.01.0,2  with  everything  else remaining  constant.  Notice  that  the
portfolio  set  corresponding  to  b=l  lies  above  the  original
portfolio set. The intuition behind  this result  is that a lower
bias, ceteris paribus,  implies better returns from short-hedging.
Assuming that the underlying variance has not changed, return is
higher for the same l vel of risk, thus lowering the opportuni v
costs of hedging. On the other hand, increases in the bias, ceteris
paAribus,  will  shift down  the portfolio set,  leading to a  lower
return for the same risk and increasing the opportunity cost of
hedging.>
We emphasize again that a  positive bias is just as  probable
as a negative bias. The risk-return trade-offs in the sample  period
depended upon a particular spot-futures price relationship. These
trade-offs would, of course, be different in another period. In the
long run, however, the expected gains from hedging will  tend to
zero. For a risk-averse hedger, the benefits of hedging lie not so
much in any potential for increased returns as in the reduction in
variance.
"This value was chosen pure'Ly  for illustrative purposes. Any
value different from the original bias value of 1.152 would have
served our purpose just as well.
24 Ederington  (1979) defines the basis as:  (F 1+1-St+ 1)  - (Ft-St)
This  can  be  rewritten  as:  (Ft+ 1-Ft)-(St+ 1-S,).  Holding  (S,+ 1-St)
constant, an increase in the futures bias increases the basis and
a decrease in the futures bias decreases the basis. A decreasing
bias, and consequently a decreasing basis, increases the returns to
short-hedging (see  Working, 1953).  Thus, the discussion here could
also have been conducted in terms of changes in the basis.III.  SWOIARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Cotton  exports  are a  significant  part  of agricultural  and
total  export  revenues  for  the  majority  of  Francophone  African
countries.  In  most  cases  the  share  of  cotton  exports  has
increased,  which  means  that  Francophone  African  countries  have
increased exposure to cotton price volatility.
The major part of the cotton price risk has been borne by the
parastatal marketing authorities and ultimately by the government.
This was  because  of the  fixed prices  paid  to producers.  This
fixity created problems during periods of persistent cotton price
declines.  Recent reforms have lessened some of the governments'
exposure to  cotton price volatility by introducing flexibility into
the producer pricing system.  This was done by linking the final
producer  return to actual export revenues.  At delivery, cotton
producers now receive about 80* of the floor price announced at the
beginning of the planting season with the balance paid at the end
of  the season.  However,  the adoption  of  such a  measure  still
leaves a large part of the cotton price risk with the government.
(Additional  noteworthy reforms include increases in  the operational
efficiency  of  the  parastatals,  reductions  in  cotton  marketing
costs, and changes in taxation).Francophone  countries  have depended  heavily on  the use  of
stabilization  funds to provide price  stabilization.  In theory,
funds are accumulated during periods of high prices and are paid
out  during  periods  of  low prices.  However,  in practice,  the
available  funds  were  often  insufficient during  periods  of  low
prices, creating budgetary problems for governments.
In recent years, the main risk management instrument used by
Francophone  African cotton  producers has been the forward contract.
Countries  usually sell forward about one-fourth  to one-third of
their expected crop before  they announce producer prices.  That
still results in significant government exposure as the major part
of  the crop is unhedgea before producer prices are set.
The idea behind forward sales is that they provide a hedge for
the stabilization fund.  By obtaining a price for future exports,
forward sales increase the predictability of accruals or payments
from the stabilization funds.  In a sense, therefore the fund can
be though of as a means  to stabilize inter-year price movements
while the forward sales stabilize intra-year price movements.  This
does not make the fund immortal, but does increase the likelihood
of survival.  However, use of forward sales has limitations as they
rely on a buyer being available at the appropriate time. Futures
contracts do not have this constraint--as liquidity is  usually firm
up to 12 months ahead.  Thus futures contracts could be used in
addition to the forward sales to cover the remaining price risk.As economic  reforms  progress  in the FPA countries,  the need
for effective commodity price risk management will  increase.
Primary goals will be to remove the impediments  to transparent
price formation,  so that prices at each marketing stage will
reflect  an  appropriate  relationship  to final  demand  for  the  product
and to provide incentives  for market  participants  to hedge  price
risks.  Information  to achieve  these  goals includes:  well  defined
product quality standards,  marketing and processing agents and
transportation  and storage systems  operating  competitively,  and
freedom  for  all  participants  to sell  products  in  domestic  or  export
markets. Under  these  conditions  the  domestic  marketing  system  will
be efficient  as will  be the  allocation  of production  resources.  If
the  exporters are  to  undertake the  risk  management, which
ultimately will benefit the  farmers, prices will need to be
transmitted  in a transparent  and  efficient  manner.  The
creation  of domestic  spot  markets  for cotton  may be a first  step
towards this end.  A forward  market could be developed  at some
later  stage.  Domestic  spot  and  forward  markets  provide
opportunities  for  price  discovery,  crop  financing  and  risk  sharing.
To see  the  benefits  which  could  be gained  from  use  of futures
contracts,  this  paper  investigated  the  risk  reduction  prospects  for
FPA cotton  using  portfolio  analysis.  A portfolio  model  of hedging
was developed  in which the decision problem was to select the
optimal hedge ratio under  two  behavioral assumptions - risk
minimization or  utility maximization under risk aversion. We foundU
that "cross-hedges"  for  PPA  cotton  have  significant  risk  reduction
potential.  We simulated  ex-ante  cross-hedges  for  three  years (1989,
1990,  1991)  and found  that in each  case,  hedging  was effective  in
reducing  price  risk.
We also investigated  the effect of risk aversion  on the
optimal hedge ratio  under the assumption  of a quadratic  utility
function.  We found  that  over  a  large  range  of risk-aversion  values,
the risk-minimizing  hedge ratio  was virtually  constant.  For most
practical  purposes  it  seems  that  the  assumption of  risk-
minimization  is  eminently  reasonable.  We  found  that  for  most
plausible  values  of risk  aversion,  the  recommended  hedge  ratio  was
significantly  less  than one, with estimates  of the optimal  hedge
ratio (both  ex-ante and  pxga2t,)  ranging  between 0.29 to 0.65  2
At very low  values  of risk  avers 4on  our results  indicate  that  long
hedging  would  be optimal.
We also quantified  the opportunity  costs  of hedging  in
terms of foregone returns. Our results indicate that over the
sample  period, l  reduction  in risk could  lead to a reduction  in
return  between 0.66t  and 1.12w.  We also discussed  the manner  in
which changes  in the  bias affect  the optimal  hedge  ratio  and the
portfolio  opportunity  set.
'The  hedge ratio indicates  the amount  of futures  contracts
needed  to hedge  a certain  quantity  of the  physical  commodity. For
example,  for  cotton,  a hedge  ratio  of .5  indicates  that  for  hedging
100,000  lbs of cotton  one needs  one N.Y. cotton  futures  contract
(100,000  x .5  - 50,000).46
We conclude  that there  are risk-reduction  benefits  from
hedging FPA  cotton using the New  York No.  2  cotton futures
contracts.  We have  also  provided  some  estimates  of the  hedging  cost
that  may  aid in  deciding  whether  the  benefit-cost  ratio  of hedging
is  reasonable  or not.17
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